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In this paper I argue that the early moral philosophy of Ákos Pauler was informed 
by eugenic and racial hygienic theories of his age. Perhaps one of the key social 
theorists of his time was the British philosopher Herbert Spencer who arguably had 
an infl uence on the moral theories of Pauler as well. Pauler became an infl uential 
theoretician in Hungary during the interwar period. His ideological commitments 
to Christinity and national values made him favorable to the authoritarian politics 
of the 1920s and 30s. His signifi cance lasted until the end of the 1940s; during the 
Socialist period from 1948 to 1989 Pauler’s heritage was played down because of 
the idological divide between the two political eras. However, after the transition, 
the works of Pauler were re-discovered and my study contributes to this strand 
of research from an intersectional perspective. In this paper I will analyze how 
conceptulizations of race and gender structured their moral theories in which the 
responsibility of women was understood in terms of their reproductive contribution 
to their country’s racial future. I claim that Pauler’s early moral philosophy rests on 
racially informed principles that justify gender subordination.1
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Introduction
In this paper I compare how conceptualizations of race and gender played a role 
in structuring the moral theory of the British social philosopher Herbert Spencer 
in the nineteenth century and the early work of the Hungarian philosopher Ákos 
Pauler in the twentieth Century. Spencer was a very infl uential thinker of his age 
and his works were important for Hungarian progressive thinkers as well – Ákos 
Pauler was arguably one of them. Pauler became an infl uential theoretician in 
Hungary during the interwar period. His ideological commitments to Christinity 
and national values made him favorable to the authoritarian racially exclusionary 
politics of his time. Here I would only stress his anti-Semitism to maintain my 
claim, as he openly supported the numerus clausus law, which limited the number 
of Jewish Hungarian university students (Somos 1999). Mária Kovács claims that 
this law, which was enacted in 1921, was the fi rst Jewish law of the Horthy-era and 
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thus  marks an exclusionary racial thinking embraced by the state (Kovács 2012). 
During the Socialist period from 1948 to 1989 Pauler’s heritage was played down 
because of the ideological divide between the two political eras (Somos 1999). 
However, after the transition, the works of Pauler were re-discovered and scholars 
started to show interest in re-interpreting his work to better understand his role 
in the development of Hungarian philosophy (Somos 1999, Gángó 2011, Frenyó 
2014, Somos 2016). My study contributes to this strand of analysis by looking at 
his moral philosophy from a perspective that allowed the critical appreciation of 
Spencer’s ethics by shedding light on some of his problematic heritage.
More specifi cally, Spencer was critiqued for his arguments founded on Dar-
win’s theory of evolution to justify racial and gender hierarchy (Paxton 1991, 
Gondermann 2007, Jeynes 2010). A contemporary school in feminist theoris-
ing argues that race, class, and gender are not separable identities but  mutually 
structure our thinking and our social conduct (Crenshaw 1989, Hill Collins 1991, 
Staunæs 2003, McCall 2005, Kóczé 2009). Thus when we look at an ethical prob-
lem such as the subordination of women it is necessary to understand how race, 
class, religion (and depending on the social context other identities, perhaps, as 
well) act as social forces that structure our life and realize qualitatively diff erent 
experiences. This intersectional framework is useful not only to show how in-
dividual lives are marginalized and discriminated but to reveal how theoretical 
works are structured by the implicit racial and gender ideologies of the authors. 
Hence, in the case of Pauler I will show that his early moral philosophy rests on 
racially informed principles that justify gender subordination.
In order to accomplish this I will fi rst analyze how evolutionism infl uenced 
their moral thinking, then from this stage I will look at how we can account for 
freedom in their ethical theory and the kind of freedom they embraced. A related 
question is how their conceptualizations of freedom gave foundations to good 
and bad conduct. These various stages prepare the groundwork for an analysis 
of how women were subordinated in their theories and how race as a concept in-
fl uenced their views on the ethical duties and capabilities of women. I argue that 
the biologization of the interest of  race was used to justify the subordination of 
women in their social philosophies.
Evolutionism Infl uenced Ethics
The theory of evolution had a signifi cant impact on Spencer’s theorization of soci-
ety in which moral and political issues were included. He explained how biological 
evolution divides humanity into superior and inferior races. In his analysis the pri-
mary contrasting point is the technological development and the structural com-
plexity of European societies in comparison to the social structures of “savages” 
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(Spencer 1978a, pp. 48-49). Spencer argued for the division of “races” and tried to 
give a sound justifi cation in his analysis of good conduct. In his view good conduct 
equated to those human actions or set of actions that help the evolution of the race. 
He claimed that evolution had a signifi cant eff ect on conduct in general. According 
to him, ethical actions are guided by evolutionary conduct, which has assisted evo-
lution, and so infl uenced the everyday practices of the individual (Spencer 1978a, 
pp. 50-51). His argument concerning the everyday practices of the individual is im-
portant, because I think Spencer understood possible and desirable ways of living 
as having this biological underpinning, which constrained and limited the ethically 
acceptable actions of the individual in order to promote the interest of the race.
Pauler agrees that the biological characteristics of the individual are the basic 
elements of moral actions within the social structure,  however he argued that they 
are still insuffi  cient if the anthropological characteristics of the race2 were not pref-
erable. Only good anthropological qualities of a race could support evolution and 
this allows the evolution of a high moral level. Pauler further claimed that not all 
human cultures were capable of creating a high cultural level, which  in his view 
accounted for the moral diff erences between cultures. He tried to support his ar-
gument from an imperialist position that civilization spreads across the globe via 
European expansion  which is the right direction regarding  the evolution of hu-
manity. When he discussed the relation of ethics and biology Pauler argued that 
biology has an eff ect on ethics only from the perspective of the complexity of life-
forms (Pauler 1907). He claimed that complex life forms such as a human life have 
the potential for complex moral actions. He was convinced that only  biologically 
evolved life-forms are capable of acting according to a complex ethical system. And 
biological evolution has an eff ect on the complexity of ethics only in terms of the 
capabilities of humans. In his view life as such has no value, and this is the reason, 
he argued, humans have to sacrifi ce their lives in order to fulfi l their social duties. 
He did not want to position himself as an ethical naturalist, thus he advanced an ar-
gument against the evolutionary idea of the battle of the races, or between individ-
uals, which was a Spencerian idea. Pauler claimed this biological presupposition 
cannot serve as a universal principle of ethics for humanity entirely (Pauler 1907, 
pp. 46-49). Despite this tension between Spencer’s understanding and his own, 
Pauler subordinated the value of individual action to the interest of the race. He was 
thinking in an anthropological racial frame (see for example Pauler 1907, p. 137) 
as did most of his contemporaries in Hungary (see Laff erton 2007, p. 730). Pauler 
created an ethical system that he intended to serve as grounds for the existence of 
universal values but he did not take into account that his system would marginalize 
individuals and communities should these individuals and groups fail to internal-
ize the right values and act according to these ideals in the interest of the race.
Pauler defi ned biological evolution as one among the basic empirical presup-
positions of morals. In this analysis (Pauler 1907, pp. 91-96) he claimed that 
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the biological structure of the individual has an eff ect on his/her morality. In his 
examples, he listed and compared healthy individuals with individuals who were 
considered by him and his contemporaries to be ‘degenerates’. He continued by 
explaining that the healthy individual has more capacity for moral actions than 
the “degenerate” individual. Based on these examples  he argued that if a healthy 
person becomes ill, and suff ers from this health problem for some time, this will 
aff ect him/her morally. In this case he relied on superfi cial stereotypes and tried 
to come up with a generally acceptable argument against the moral capacities of 
alcoholics and other “degenerates.” He managed to conclude that the degenera-
tion of the individual has an eff ect on the level of his/her morality and from this 
standpoint he claimed that the laws of inheritance imply that these “degenerate” 
individuals pass on their moral capacities to their children. In summary, what 
was set out by him in this part of his argument is that  more evolved biological 
life corresponds to a more evolved morality (Pauler 1907, p. 96). Along these 
lines Pauler basically fragments  society with biological terms and deems certain 
lives to be incapable of a high level of morality. In my view, this is important, be-
cause he links moral capabilities with eugenic ideas and problematized individual 
health issues as if these were  transgenerational social problems.
The Concept of Freedom in their Ethical Positions
Both Spencer and Pauler could be interpreted as philosophers infl uenced by Kant 
either directly or indirectly. Because for Kant the right of the individual to free-
dom is primary, however this individual freedom is limited by obligations to-
wards  society. In relation to free will and morals, Spencer’s account of free will 
is very similar to that of Kant. The major diff erence in their reasoning is in the 
emphasis on the priority of individual freedom and the obligations of the individ-
ual to  society; but both agreed on the importance of freedom in relation to ethical 
theory and the ethical actions of the individual. Spencer claimed that in his ethics 
the freedom and free actions of the individual are primary and the limitations on 
individual freedom by others are of only secondary importance (Spencer 1978b, 
pp. 451-453). I fundamentally believe that Spencer presented a very sympathetic 
account of individual freedom, but this ‘universal’ freedom implied only male 
freedom; in his detailed analysis women did not have an equal right to free ac-
tions: their freedom always depended on men.
In contrast to Kant, Pauler argued that the metaphysical problem of free will has 
no relevance to metaethical problems. He claimed that Kant’s mistake was that he 
confused freedom with autonomy and Pauler argued, that moral autonomy is fun-
damentally a concept which belongs to moral theory and not ontology. He tried to 
go beyond the Kantian principle of moral autonomy which implies the ethical value 
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of an act in its own right. While he analyzed this issue his aim was to disconnect the 
problem of free will from the sphere of ethics. He claimed that Kant was not right 
in connecting the question of freedom to morality. In his analysis Pauler pointed 
out that a moral action is good if it has a value in itself. In his theory moral values 
are universal therefore, he argued, they have no connection with existence (Pauler 
1907, p. 124). In my view it is problematic that Pauler’s idealist ethics excludes 
freedom from ethical judgments because this theoretical approach precisely denies 
the possibility of the individual’s ability to critically distance himself/herself from 
an act, and  using reason is able to judge from another perspective. Pauler did not 
separate ethical questions according to gender in relation to freedom; This could 
be interpreted as  him intending  to prove through pure logical analysis that  moral 
ideals as described are the principles that every individual must internalize in or-
der to act in accordance with the highest good for the benefi t of  society. But this 
interpretation must be tempered in view of Pauler’s exclusionary political values. 
From this perspective it is rather the case that he constructed a moral theory from 
a middle-class, Christian perspective imbued with a strong nationalist bias only 
ostensibly universal. In trying to avoid relativism and consciously trying to create a 
theory of universal ethics, he rejected the possibility of plural value systems.
The Basis of Good and Bad Conduct
In his analysis of good and bad conduct Spencer described what we generally 
perceive as good or bad. This approach maintained that, value judgments were 
always made in relation to the act of the individual and its end. This means that 
the relation of an action to its end provides the basis for a judgment as to its value. 
He claimed that we can distinguish between this good and bad conduct according 
to their state of evolution. That conduct which is relatively more evolved could be 
regarded as relatively good conduct, and that which is less evolved is bad conduct 
(Spencer 1978a, p. 61). Spencer connects goodness to actions in three basic ways: 
those acts are good, which (1) are good for the individual who acts, (2) good for 
the individual’s off spring, (3) and goodness is associated with acts that further the 
pleasurable living of others (Spencer 1978a, p. 79). Weinstein interprets Spencer’s 
defi nition of a good act as referring to actions that “promote the greatest totality of 
life” in other words “greatest length and greatest breadth of life for all members 
of  society” (Weinstein 1998, p. 143). According to Weinstein length of life relates 
to the importance of self-preservation.  He interprets  Spencer’s breadth of life as 
being  the quality of life which refers to  a pleasurable life that should be realized 
through good conduct, which ultimately promotes the reproduction of the race.
When discussing the value of life, Spencer presented optimistic and pessimistic 
views of how individuals can experience their lives (Spencer 1978a, p. 63). He 
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claimed that if living causes more pain than pleasure then life is not worth living 
and in opposition to this standpoint, if the dominant experience in someone’s life 
is pleasure, then life is valuable for the individual. This seems to be a relativist per-
spective, but Spencer managed to fi nd a common point between the optimistic and 
pessimistic views of life, which is the point when the good and bad experiences 
diverge according to the senses of the individual. He stated that everyone agrees to 
judge life worth living or not if the conscious feeling of the individual rises above 
or declines under the level of indiff erence into a pleasurable or painful feeling.
Spencer related good and bad conduct to life by diff erentiating them into two 
groups of actions. Those acts which contribute to the pleasurable feeling of life 
are good conduct and those which make life unbearable are bad conduct. In rela-
tion to Christianity Spencer emphasized that the peoples of this religion believe 
that self-caused pleasure is not morally acceptable to their God. As a result Spen-
cer argued that pleasure cannot serve as a central category in defi ning the seman-
tic fi eld of ‘the good’ (Spencer 1978a, p. 64) in these religions. Spencer refused 
to accept the Christian moral tradition and claimed that conduct which causes 
pleasure to oneself or others is good.  His conclusion therefore was that “the good 
is universally the pleasurable” (Spencer 1978a, p. 66).
In Pauler’s moral theory the central ethical categories are truth, good, and 
beauty; thus his view of good ethical actions were based on these categories. 
Using these notions as starting points he defi ned the concept of ethical value as 
something which must be unconditional or something which is in the process of 
becoming unconditional in nature. These ethical values become real only when 
empirical actions are realized, and these realized actions have value in relation 
to the ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty. Pauler explained the signifi cance of 
these ideas in the following way: (1) truth is important because we can realize it 
using the human faculty of correct reasoning, (2) we can realize good by ethical 
actions and (3) the self-value of beauty is immediately available for human be-
ings through perception (Pauler 1907, p. 129). He maintained that we can defi ne 
good as the value by which we act while considering the relations of these central 
categories, although he noted that the analysis of beauty as an absolute value lies 
outside the frame of his work, he therefore omitted that from his investigation.
The following section will lay out the relation of the absolute ethical values 
of truth and goodness in his ethical theory. He claimed that the absolute value 
of truth can be proved simply through the logic of denial. If someone denies the 
truth value of something, the truth value is indicated in the act of denial; Pauler 
suggested, in other words, that the act of denying a truth has truth value in itself. 
There are two criteria that he set for the absolute value: (1) it must be a value in it-
self and (2) it must be realized unconditionally (Pauler 1907, p. 130). He conclud-
ed that the ethical value of truth defi nes the ethical value of goodness, which is 
to say that if truth has absolute value, then those human actions which are aimed 
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at realizing the truth are ethically good, and therefore good as an absolute ethical 
value, because the act corresponds with its truth value (Pauler 1907, p. 131).This 
in his view proved the absolute value of truth which serves as a foundation on 
which to realize good ethical actions.
In order to realize the truth, Pauler encompassed three attitudes in his argument 
which have to guide our actions. These attitudes are love, respect, and faith. He 
claimed we must love truth in order to realize it in our ethical behaviour. We can-
not realize absolute truth if we do not act as those who love truth, and we have to 
acknowledge love for this reason as an ethical value. He added to this argument 
that we can realize absolute truth if we have the right energy to pursue our actions 
(Pauler 1907, p. 132). Pauler used attitudes such as love, faith, respect, and right 
energy which themselves are loaded with ethical values. He tried to integrate 
these attitudes into each other: to respect truth is only possible if the individual in 
this system acknowledges the ethical value of the act of right respect.
Ethical behaviour is equivalent to the behaviour which realizes the truth, thus 
Pauler maintained, truth and goodness are absolute values because they are dif-
ferent ideals of the same behaviour and this ethical behaviour gains value because 
it corresponds to the unconditional truth. One cannot realize truth without ethics, 
because the realization of truth itself is an ethical act, therefore, he claimed, it is 
not possible to establish a strict hierarchy between the values of truth and good-
ness. However he noted that the realization of truth has a necessary presupposi-
tion, which is the realization of ethical value as such (Pauler 1907, pp. 133-134). 
In his view this way of reasoning proves from a moral theoretical perspective 
that only good morals can give real value to human life, because this is the basic 
ground which enables individuals to use their reasoning capacities properly.
Pauler analyzed the concept of the highest good because of its centrality in mor-
al theory. This is a theoretical point which needs further clarifi cation in order to 
understand how he thought that morally wrong actions can be judged in relation to 
the ideal of the good. He described this concept that defi nes the right mode of mor-
al judgments which serve as the basis for human actions. In his words in sum: “the 
highest good is the right and true morality” (Pauler 1907, p. 141). The purpose of 
human life is the realization of the highest good, which means humans have to live 
in order to realize the ethical ideals in their actions. He claimed this is the right way 
of life because these ends are not the results of a power which forces the individual 
to act according to the ideals of absolute ethical values but individuals themselves 
choose to live according to these moral principles (Pauler 1907, p. 158).
Pauler’s discussion is problematic from the perspective of freedom. Firstly and 
most importantly, he claimed individuals choose these ideals, which I think implies 
that they have the ability to distance themselves from wrong ethical ideals. In other 
words, these individuals can – at least on a theoretical level – critically judge what 
is wrong and act according to the ideals of the highest good. But in contrast to this 
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standpoint, Pauler explicitly excluded freedom from the sphere of ethics. However 
if, according to him, humans do not have the ability to choose their values because 
of the lack of freedom, only those live a valuable life whose acts correspond to his 
ethical system. These lead to the following problem: in Pauler’s system there are 
valuable and invaluable lives which are not worth living. This ethical system cre-
ates a hierarchy of lifestyles which, though not explicitly but implicitly support a 
hierarchization of lives corresponding to the eugenic ideology of his time.
Ethical Indications of Gender Subordination
Spencer commenced  his chapter on ‘The Rights of Women’ by discussing that 
equal freedom is a birthright for every individual. He argued that for the same 
reason those who have disabilities must  have the same rights as those who are 
seemingly healthy. However, he eventually concluded that the overall situation 
of women is not that bad compared to the uncivilized cultures of savages, where 
subjection of the opposite sex sometimes takes extreme forms (Spencer 1978b, 
pp. 181-182). In comparison to these societies, he argued that the subjection of 
women in Europe is much less extreme, moreover, he viewed it to be reasonable 
and necessary for the interest of further social progress. He tried to support his 
argument by invoking the social practice that women do  not serve in the army 
and navy, and therefore  do not share the same burden as men, which according 
to him justifi es  the denial of equal political rights to women (Spencer 1978b, 
p. 183). Thus by denying equal freedom for women he placed them under the 
authority of men; by subjecting women to men denied everyone’s individuality 
inasmuch as making a distinction between political rights based on sex. Moreo-
ver, Spencer supported his argument by claiming that it is the interest of race in 
order to achieve a socio-political condition where political authority will have no 
importance (Francis 2007, pp. 74-75).
Spencer maintained  that the most important characteristic of women is to be 
beautiful (Paxton 1991, Francis 2007). His logic was simple; he reduced the val-
ue of women to reproduction. Women were important only to reproduce the race 
therefore their most important quality was to be physically attractive. Only in this 
way  could women become valuable members of a community, which implies 
that women had very limited individual agency, since they were always defi ned 
and valued through their relation to men/or to the social position of their husbands 
(Francis 2007). Francis’ argument explains why Spencer supported the institution 
of marriage in his ethics – without any suggestion for reform – and understood its 
signifi cance as a necessity in the maintenance of the race (Spencer 1978a). Spen-
cer analyzed the tension between individual life and social responsibility which 
demanded sacrifi ce from  parents for the general good of the race. Spencer stated 
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that  it is impossible  to resolve this tension between individual and social life but 
argued that individuals have to subordinate their personal good to the progeny 
of the race. In his account of marriage, Spencer analyzed the most conventional 
economic and social aspects which have an impact on the marriages of young 
individuals. He listed various examples, such as social status, social relations, 
and various other driving forces in marriage. He did not exclude love marriages, 
but wanted to emphasize other factors than physical and psychological attraction. 
Spencer underscored that these factors are superfi cial and most of the time, the 
literature does not place emphasis on the vital characteristics of the parties who 
intended to marry each other. However, he noted this as the most important factor 
since the vitality of the parents defi nes the biological characteristics of their chil-
dren, which is in the interest of race maintenance. He argued that ethics should 
drive the habits of  individuals and ethical principles should control physiological 
instincts in order to serve the healthy reproduction of the race (Spencer 1978a, 
p. 572). This line of thought has been adopted  by many Hungarian thinkers who 
supported eugenics, these naturalists made  suggestions as to how to implement 
these eugenic principles into the practical realization of eugenic ideals (see for 
example Apáthy 1914). In contrast to Spencer, Pauler did not provide detailed 
suggestions for the healthy reproduction of the race,  he did however fundamen-
tally advocate similar ethical principles, which subjected individual life to the 
reproduction of the race.
In his chapter on the value of life Pauler placed biological life in the service 
of the realization of the right ethical ideals. He stated that  we must take care of 
our lives and we have to develop ourselves but only in order to realize the right 
ethical ideals, which are in his case defi ned by his Platonic Christian approach 
to ethics. In his ethical system life as such has value only insofar as individual 
actions correspond to the right ethical ideals (Pauler 1907, pp. 229-230). The con-
sequence of this standpoint, he claimed, is that our moral duty is to preserve our 
lives but at the same time we have to sacrifi ce ourselves to fulfi l our social duties. 
I think the danger of his argument lies in – the perhaps unintended consequence 
of – his aim: to establish a theoretical ground from which certain ways of life can 
be judged as worthless.
In the discussion about the value of life, Pauler analyzed the physiological 
needs of the human body (Pauler 1907, p. 230). His moral theory refuses any kind 
of lecherous way of life. According to his ethical principles humans have to use 
their body properly: the way that corresponds to the social duty assigned to those 
bodies. Individuals must keep their bodies  healthy  – they have to refrain from 
alcohol or from those sexual pleasures which are not the result of conscious re-
productive action – in order to subject their sexuality to the interest of their race. 
These physiological actions are constrained by his normative ethical principles. 
“Normalizing the individuals’ instinctual lives is especially important regarding 
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sexual life, because the danger of hedonism haunts here the most” (Pauler 1907, 
p. 301). The argument supporting his standpoint rests on the presupposition that 
life is not an end in itself therefore those pleasures which are gained through 
the fulfi llment of bodily sexual needs are ethically wrong and humans should 
refrain from practicing them. He stated that sexual acts are only acceptable if 
the ends of these actions are reproduction, otherwise sexual desires are ethically 
unacceptable. The most important value of sexuality lies in its end which is the 
preservation of the race. This means that Pauler subordinated sexuality and every 
other physiological need to the interest of the race. Individual behaviour is only 
valuable if it corresponds to transgenerational responsibility dictated by racial 
interest. He labeled any kind of contraception ethically wrong because it contra-
dicts the biological function of sexuality, as he understood it. For the same reason 
he claimed any kind of sexual perversity has to be considered morally wrong 
which distances sexual acts from their right value and original function. Thus 
Pauler, similarly to Spencer, considered only heterosexuality valuable, and only 
those sexual acts that aimed at contributing to the reproduction of the race. The 
social values of women thus were similarly subordinated to racial interest as in 
the work of Spencer. However Pauler reached this similar position that rested on 
the biologization of gender by basing it on a Christian Platonic approach.
Conclusion
In this paper I argued that Pauler’s early moral theory was infl uenced by evo-
lutionism and his conceptualization of race supported the subjection of women 
in a  social hierarchy. Critical works regarding Spencer’s thinking gave a more 
nuanced perspective of  his social values and how these aff ected a worldview 
that was positively received by eugenic theorists during the early 1900s. Eugenic 
ideas appeared in Hungary in the fi rst decade of the twentieth century and Hun-
garian eugenic thinking was greatly infl uenced by the anthropological conceptu-
alization of race. Thus the analysis of Pauler’s work from a critical perspective 
that places emphasis on the conceptualization of race and gender contribute to a 
more nuanced understanding on how philosophy  infl uenced  the developments 
of eugenics in the interwar period.
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Notes
 1 I benefi ted from the suggestions of Andrea Pető, Colin Swatridge, and an anonymous reviewer. 
I would like to express my gratitude for their feedback. 
 2 At the turn of the century, the dominant understanding of the race concept in Hungary was the 
anthropological one, and within this anthropological understanding, biological qualities played 
an important role in clarifying the boundaries of the Hungarian race (Laff erton, 2007). 
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